Sunday, August 18, 2013

Red Terror’ inside India

Red Terror’ inside India

Source: By Sunanda k. dutta ray: The Free Press Journal

India is at war with itself. The carnage in Bastar was not unlike the insurgency that ravaged Malaya for 34 years, and which, ironically, started in what was still called Calcutta. Ranjit Gupta, Calcutta's police commissioner, who helped to suppress the first Naxalite rebellion in the late 1960s, claimed to have derived his strategy from the Malayan Emergency. He said that General Sir Gerald Templar, the British army commander, who broke the back of the rebels in Malaya, said that since the rebels claimed to be fish swimming in water, he poisoned the water. Gupta professed to follow a similar strategy in tackling Bengali Naxalites.

The Malayan Emergency began on June 16, 1948, when three European plantation managers were killed in Perak state. But the cataclysm that convulsed the Malayan peninsula for 12 years, and then for another 22, as the terrorists revived their campaign, began with the February 19- 23, 1948 Calcutta Conference of outh and Students of South- east Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence. It was held under the auspices of the World Federation of Democratic outh ( WFD) and the International Union of Students ( IUS), but the delegates in the rundown hutments that American troops had used as their wartime hospital were hardly youths or students. There were commissars from the Soviet Union, Australian ideologues, French trade unionists, battle- hardened Vietminh officers, ugoslav revolutionaries and Malayan Chinese guerrillas.

Radical Bengalis, who clung to the myth of Lenin predicting that the road to world revolution would run from Peking to Paris via Calcutta, welcomed the conference, which was preceded by four WFD members travelling through several Asian countries to survey colonial conditions and establish links with local youth movements.

Ashok Mitra, West Bengal's former Left Front finance minister, and Jolly Mohan Kaul, former Bengal general secretary of the undivided CPI, both participated in the conference, but don't seem to have realised that the Comintern orchestrated the event or that the Malayan Communist Party ( MCP) was ordered there to go on the offensive in accordance with the Soviet Union's global strategy.

The MCP's Lee Siong, " who had been chosen to attend because he spoke good English", went from Calcutta to Rangoon for a peasants' congress and thence by boat to Singapore ( then part of Malaya), arriving a day after the MCP's fourth plenary meeting ended. But Lawrence Sharkey, president of the Australian Communist Party, who had travelled direct to Singapore on March 9 and stayed there until March 20, attended the plenary where the decision to revolt was taken. Presumably, he conveyed to the Malayan ( Chinese) comrades the Calcutta conference's secret recommendation of armed struggle. Insurrections broke out almost simultaneously in India ( Telangana), Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines and of course Malaya.

There were additional local reasons for each uprising, but historians believe that the Calcutta gathering, egged on by Le Tam, leader of the Vietnamese delegation, and two militant ugoslavs, could have been the common ignition.

B. V. Keskar, India's deputy minister for external affairs, reported after touring South- east Asia, that far from being freedom- fighters, the Communists were outright bandits. The British called them terrorists.

Indians in Malaya played only a minor part in the revolt. Many of them were INA veterans. Shocked by Mahatma Gandhi's murder in January 1948, even those Indians who had drifted into the MCP repudiated violence. The main rebels were around 500,000 of the 3.12 million ethnic Chinese in Malaya. Being farmers living on the edge of the jungles, where the MCP's military arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army ( MLNA) operated, they supplied the guerrillas with food and new recruits. Ethnic Malays ( today's bumiputra) supported them in smaller numbers. A special Malay unit, known as the 10th Regiment, was established under the leadership of a Central Committee member, Abdullah C. D., who also established several " Masses Revolutionary Schools" ( Sekolah Revolusi Rakyat), to disseminate Maoist ideas.

Since the MCP was based in southern Thailand, most of its recruits were Thai Malays and people from the north- eastern Malayan state of Kelantan.

The Chinese supported the MNLA because they were denied citizenship and voting rights, had no land rights to speak of, and were usually very poor. The MNLA's supply organisation, " Min uen", enjoyed a network of contacts among the general population. Besides supplying food and other material, it was an important source of information.

The colonial government called the rebellion, whose first phase lasted from 1948 to 1960, the Malayan Emergency. The MNLA termed it the Anti- British National Liberation War. The British- owned rubber plantations and tin mining industries had pushed for the use of the term " emergency", since Lloyd's insurers in London did not cover losses suffered in war. Despite the Communists' defeat in 1960, the Communist leader, Chin Peng, renewed the insurgency in 1967 - when it was known as the Communist Insurgency War - and did not lay down arms until 1989. The Australian and British armed forces had fully withdrawn years earlier. Malaysia was independent, and the insurgents were fighting the virulently anti- Communist prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and his indigenous government. But still they failed.

Unlike the Malayan rebellion, India's Red Terror is not directed from outside, even if it receives some material help from foreign sources. But as in Malaya, here too there is a long history of deprivation, discrimination and rankling resentment in which ethnic and economic grievances overlap. Bastar hasn't forgotten its 20th maharaja, Praveen Chandra Bhanj Deo, who was killed on March 25, 1966, by the then Congress government of Madhya Pradesh. He was the priest of the Danteshwari temple ( where the Chhattisgarh chief minister, Mr Raman Singh, recently began his Vikas atra) and represented Jagdalpur in the Vidhan Sabha.

The tribals adored him. The state authorities felt threatened by his immense popularity, the vigour with which he championed the cause of his erstwhile subjects, and his political campaigning against exploitation of the region's natural resources and corruption in land reforms.

Given the government's attitude, many believe the " police encounter" in which Praveen Chandra was shot dead, was premeditated murder. The dead maharaja's grandson, Kamal Chandra Bhanj Deo, is now taking an interest in the Chhattisgarh assembly elections scheduled for later this year.

The mix of feudal loyalty, religious passion, historical exploitation and ethnic injustice churned in the explosive bowl of ideology resulted in the massacre of 76 CRP jawans only three years ago. It will not be wished away by dismissing Chhattisgarh's BJP government and imposing President's Rule. Even full- fledged deployment of the army alone will not ensure peace.

Tragically, force cannot be avoided in a situation where a large area ( with a large number of people) is in open rebellion against the state and its institutions. But force has to be based on intelligence -- of which there is little trace now - and a situation must be created so that the rebels are totally isolated.

That was Templer's poisoningthe- water strategy that Gupta admired and emulated. I should imagine Mahendra Karma earned the undying hatred of the Chhattisgarh rebels because his Salwa Judum attempted something similar.

Ungoverned spaces

Ungoverned spaces

Source: By V Mahalingam: The Statesman

DESPITE the Prime Minister declaring that the Maoists pose the most serious threat to national security, the country doesn’t seem to be coming to grips with the challenge posed by the CPI (Maoist). As of now, 83 districts in central India are said to be affected by the menace. Ever since 2010, the country has been witnessing a spate of major Naxal attacks in Chhattisgarh, among the latest being the Darbha massacre on 25 May,  killing over 27 people including several Congress leaders.

After every Naxal attack, a plethora of fancy suggestions and remedies are offered by politicians, bureaucrats and arm-chair intelligentsia exposing their mistaken understanding of the conflict.  With truth having been given a go-by, assessments of the basic issues involved and the remedies suggested are often flawed. The creation of the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand, the liberalization of the mining policy in 2003, and the enactment of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, provided the impetus to the leaders of the fledgling states to go ahead with industrialization, without considering the plight of the local Scheduled Tribes. Industrialization in an area replete with large mineral and forest wealth suited the corporate class as well as the politicians. The general public, who were craving for growth and employment opportunities, ignored the motives behind the move and its almost inevitable impact on the lives of tribals. The Government believed that the locals could be browbeaten.

Somewhere down the line, the Government seems to have lost sight of the fact that governance and administration are relevant only as long as they safeguard the interests of the people who they are supposed to govern. When the government is  biased in favour of land-grabbers and moneyed industrialists, it becomes irrelevant. Those who sympathize with the poor, their sufferings and support them  become germane. This is exactly what has happened at the cost of the Maoists becoming the Robin Hoods.

The authorities signed a number of  MoUs with industrial houses and the details of the  deals were not disclosed to the people. Large tracts of tribal land were handed over to mining companies. The concerns of the people as well as the protests by the Gram Panchayats were ignored. No worthwhile rehabilitation measures to compensate those affected or to alleviate the hardships thus created were put in place. Given the widespread corruption across the country, the hush-hush agreements raised suspicions in the minds of the people. The corruption case involving Madhu Koda, the former Chief Minister of Jharkhand, said it all. The large mineral and forest wealth together with the land which provided a living to these tribes were at stake.

Forced  eviction from the land to accommodate the industries coupled with the highhanded arrogance of the administration caused resentment and widespread protests. The net result was violent clashes between the tribals and the police.

Apart from the question of land, the violence unleashed by the security forces to force the poor to vacate their land and dwellings provided the Maoists the much- needed grounds to exploit the tribal sentiments to their advantage. The situation was further ruined by the Government creating the Salwa Judum and launching major security operations such as Operation Green Hunt. The tribals found the Maoists ~ and not the Government ~ to be sympathetic, and the Adivasis joined the ranks of the extremists. The Maoists constitute an underground political group, which aims to overthrow the elected government through what they call a "people’s war". The party leaders and ideologues are outsiders and non-tribals, while their cadres have been recruited from amongst the locals. The situation created by the Government has provoked the Maoists to recruit the locals for the fight against the State and its forces. The locals have thus been made to fight for the Maoist cause without realising their true intent. Keeping the area under-developed, poverty and sufferings of the people suits them. The discontent simmers to their advantage.

The Maoists have established their own system of governance in the area that they claim is under their control. Protection money from industries and politicians provides the funds to sustain the movement. The money and the power of the gun that the Maoists have acquired are the primary sources of strength.

Is this a law and order issue? Has the Naxal problem come about because of lack of development, infrastructure, education and health-care facilities? Yes, these are important issues but they are not pivotal to the conflict.

As per available empirical data, most under-developed areas are not Maoist strongholds. In their 2007 study on measuring regional backwardness in India, Vani Borooah and Amresh Dubey found that out of the 100 districts with highest poverty rates, only 26 are Maoist-affected. Similarly, out of the 100 districts with highest infant mortality ratios, only nine  are Maoist-affected. And out of the 100 districts where households do not have enough food, only 15 are Maoist-affected.

Common sense would suggest that the loss of land and forcible eviction from their traditional hearth and home are central to the phenomenon of Left radicalism. What the Maoists need is justice. Until this issue is addressed squarely, nothing else is likely to work. The areas hit by Maoist activity are governed by the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees land and tribal forest rights to the Adivasis. Accordingly, tribal land and forests cannot be bartered away or its rights traded without their approval.

Assurances are unlikely to work. The Government ought to be candid enough and take the first step to reveal the details of the MoUs signed with various industrial organisations. The deals ought to be suspended pending consultations with the tribals. That will improve the credibility of the Government. On the other hand, it is likely to upset the Maoists and they may resort to violent means to oppose any reconciliation or understanding with the people.

It is here that the security forces will come into play. Meaningful follow-up dialogue, governance and development work are not possible under the threat of violence. To control violence, the security forces will have to be deployed with a view to isolate the people from the Maoists. The aim is to prevent the militants from harassing, collecting taxes or recruiting people for their cause. The locals, who have joined the Maoist cadres, will have to be weaned away through political action, village elders and their own family. The security forces will have to make a clear distinction between the people and the Maoists. They need to be categorically told that they are there to protect the people and not to harass them. The task of the security forces will be limited to containing the violence to enable the Government to repair the damage. Specifically, the build-up of  arsenal and the killing of militants must end.

The Government needs to revamp its administration which will have to shed its arrogance and corrupt practices. Every attempt must be made to choke the flow of funds. Political parties and industrial houses should stop funding and supporting the Maoists. As the process of reconciliation with the people takes shape, the Maoists are likely to target civilians as well as security forces to assert their presence and boost the morale of their own cadres. The security forces need to be extremely vigilant to deny such opportunities to the Maoists.

Should the Army be inducted to control the situation? Considering the prevailing situation,  the military ~ if deployed ~ will be in collision with the politician/ bureaucrat/industrialist nexus. The situation, such as it is, may even politicize and corrupt the force.


Giving up GWOT

Giving up GWOT

Source: By B S Prakash: Deccan Herald

The Global War on Terrorism, condensed to an ugly acronym GWOT has been officially given up in the US, the country that not too long ago had coined the term and propounded the concept. This does not mean that terrorism is ending, that the US or others need not counter it, or that it has become any less a menace. But the doctrine of declaring a ‘Global war’ against it with all its implications propounded after 9/11 by Bush-Cheney team has been given a burial by Obama in a policy change at the end of last month. No doubt, India’s fight against terrorism is different, but the issues raised have implications for us too.

Diplomats and international lawyers have failed so far and have now virtually given up the hope of reaching a universally accepted definition of terrorism. There are many definitions, no doubt, but not one under the UN, or one codified in international law and enjoying consensus. Like other basic concepts in politics, e.g. war, peace, aggression, terrorism too is a contentious concept. This is so because it is normally linked to a political or religious cause and the violence caused is defended by the group involved. To take the clearest examples, some Palestinian movements or the LTTE will maintain that what they do is no doubt violent, but that a) it is a part of their struggle for justice, and b) a reaction to the violence unleashed on them by the Israeli or the Sri Lankan State, a form of ‘State Terrorism.’ The Maoists in Chhattisgarh will make a similar argument. The elusive search for a definition has been replaced therefore by a kind of informal understanding that we know terrorism when we see it, and that it is better to focus on ‘what is done’ rather than ‘what is it done for,’ the terrorist act and not its justification.

Be that as it may, is terrorism a criminal act or a war or something in between? Such issues are of interest to scholars of political violence, a subject in itself, and to constitutional lawyers like Obama! There are good reasons to contend that major terrorist groups are engaged in a form of asymmetric warfare. A group like the Lashkar-e-taiba or Al Qaeda is organised in many ways like a fighting force with command and control, cadres and colonels, though its members may not be wearing uniforms. They have arms and ammunition and planning and strategy. They certainly carry out actions that cause destruction and death. But the terrorists do not have to match the military might of the adversary; their acts are random, unpredictable, spectacular to cause drama and often against the innocent. Hence the notion that terrorism is a form of unconventional and asymmetric warfare.

Trickier question

If so, can there be a war against terrorism? This is a trickier question. By its very nature, terrorism is shadowy. Terrorists do not wear uniforms, do not fight frontally in regular formations, and do not fit the mould of combatants as in war. Hence the currently accepted notion that a war against terrorism is more aslogan than a viable tactic. Its invocation and frequent recantation by Bush and his cohorts were not helpful in the actual action against terrorism. It is better to speak of measures against terrorism and these are multiple and not necessarily militaristic. An effective counter terrorism strategy has to have several strands, force being only one of them. Intelligence, psychological tools, stopping financial flows, draining the public support, and addressing the underlying environment are all important as our own debate about Maoists testifies.

The GWOT approach led by the US had resulted in consequences. It had made Al Qaeda alone the centre of the terrorist threat and looking at it as globally coordinated, sometimes ignored the local dimensions. The doctrine of looking at counter terrorism as a war led to Guantanamo Bay (an extra territorial area under US control but not subject to US laws), military commissions, resort to torture for extracting intelligence, the practice of shipping suspects to third countries known as extraordinary rendition etc. Some of this has arguably worked well for America, the killing of Osama Bin Laden and other senior members of Al Qaeda being the tangible results. But a point has been reached in operations and in the debate over doctrines, where Obama could come to the conclusion that he need not pursue a boundless and unending GWOT. This does not mean, however, that the US will give up on drones, or use of intrusive surveillance or other technologies available to it. It is likely that there will be greater confidence and more calculation of cost-benefit analysis in wielding such tools.

What does it mean for us? For starters, each terrorist entity will be seen on its terms and not clubbed under aglobal Jihad conglomerate. Obama is deliberately separating the hitherto threat of Al Qaeda from forms of political Islam which too may propagate violence, but not against America. The US will increasingly focus only on what is a direct and formidable threat to its interests and the most effective way of countering that threat at a minimal cost. Others including us should address each threat individually as best as we can. None of this is stated explicitly, of course, but for the US terrorism is likely to be less of a priority.


Strategic rebalancing

Strategic rebalancing

Source: By Harsh V Pant: Deccan Herald
America’s ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific continues to dominate the limelight even though the official phrase in Washington is now ‘strategic re-balancing.’ Much of this ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific is a continuation and expansion of policies already undertaken by previous administrations, as well as in president Obama’s last term. Since Obama’s inauguration in 2009, the United States has given considerable time and emphasis to Asia and to regional multilateral institutions.
Under president George W Bush, the United States emphasised the strengthening of relations with existing allies in Asia, began moving towards a more flexible and sustainable troop presence in the region, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with South Korea, brought the US into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA negotiations, and forged new partnerships with India and Vietnam. All of these steps have been furthered by the Obama administration. There are, however, a number of new aspects of the shift.
The most dramatic of these shifts lie in the military sphere. As part of a plan to expand the US presence in the southwestern Pacific and make it more flexible, the Obama administration has announced new deployments or rotations of troops and equipment to Australia and Singapore. US officials have also pledged that planned and future reductions in defence spending will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific (nor of the Middle East). Additionally, underlying the ‘pivot’ is a broader geographic vision of the Asia-Pacific region that includes the Indian Ocean and many of its coastal states. This shift in American focus will undoubtedly have an influence on how existing and potential allies of the US will create and use their own naval power.
The pivot or ‘strategic re-balancing’ articulated by the Obama administration in its first term is being operationalised in his second term, even as Washington disengages from Afghanistanand tries to focus on the management of the US domestic economy. What keeps the discussion moving forward is the fact that in response to America’s policy shift, other regional players have also started to renegotiate the terms of their engagement in the region. India is no exception. Indian defence minister’s trip to Singapore, Australia, and Thailand in early June merely underscored how seriously New Delhi is having to respond to the rapidly evolving regional geostrategic realities.
Indian defence diplomacy was in full swing in Singapore where defence minister K Antony signed a new pact to extend the use of training and exercise facilities in India by the Singapore army for five years. An agreement of this sort already exists for the Singaporean air force. This is a unique pact as Singapore is the only country to which India has offered such an arrangement reflecting the underlying comfort level that exist between the two nations. In Thailand, Antony reaffirmed the success of the prime minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangkok days back. Thailand has expressed a keen interest in India’s defence sector and Antony invited Thai teams to visit various defence production facilities in India.
Defence partnership
Antony’s trip to Australia was the first to that country by any Indian defence minister and after ignoring defence cooperation with Canberra for years, New Delhi is recognising the need for a robust defence partnership. The two states have a shared interest in managing the Indo-Pacific commons, including thevery important sea lanes of communication. Closer maritime cooperation between New Delhi and Canberra is crucial in managing the growing turbulence in the Indian Ocean region. The geostrategic environment in the IndoPacific has undergone a rapid transformation in recent years with the rapid rise of China. Washington has been working to transform the US-Australian partnership from an Asia-Pacific alliance to an Indo-Pacific alliance. Australian prime minister Julia Gillard’s visit to India last year and her government’s decision to sell uranium to India and elevate ties with India to the same league as with the US, China and Indonesia, is significant for both countries.
During Antony’s visit, the two nations decided to step up military exchanges and pursue regular dialogue on maritime security. A joint naval exercise has been scheduled for 2015 with the two states underlining that maritime security and freedom of navigation in accordance with principles of international law is critical for the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region.
India is gradually emerging as a serious player in the Asian strategic landscape as smaller states in the region reach out to it for trade, diplomacy and, potentially, as a key regional balancer.
The ‘Look East’ policy, initiated by one of the most visionary of India’s prime ministers, V Narasimha Rao, is now the cornerstone of India’s engagement with the world’s most economically dynamic region. States in South and South-east Asia also remain keen on a more pro-active Indian role in the region. India’s proximity to the region and its growing capabilities make it a natural partner of most states in East and Southeast Asia. At the broader regional level, India continues to make a strong case for its growing relevance in the East Asian regional security and economic architecture with greater urgency than ever before. Indian defence diplomacy will have to play an increasingly important role as India tries to emerge as a credible strategic partner of the regional states. Neither India nor other regional states have incentive to define their relationship in opposition to China. But they are certainly interested in leveraging their ties with other states to gain benefits from China and bring a semblance of equality in their relationships. Great power politics in the region have only just begun.

Courtesy: http://www.ksgindia.com/study-material/today-s-editorial/8002-22-june-2013.html

Iran reform

Iran reform

Source: By K.C. Singh: The Asian Age

The Iranians' message is that they want normality restored to Iran's international relations and economic stability re-established at home.

The June 14 Iranian presidential election produced a surprising result. Hassan Rowhani — the sole surviving moderate pitted against a phalange of conservatives with close links to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (SL) — won in the first round. In the 2005 election, although Hashemi Rafsanjani, the veteran, carried the first round, he fell short of simple majority and was beaten by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the runoff, the latter garnering the freed conservative vote. Iranian people’s message to the world as indeed the Supreme Leader is that they want civility and normality restored to Iran’s international relations and economic stability reestablished at home.

Mr Ahmadinejad was the first non-clerical Iranian President. But now people have reverted to a cleric, having undergone years of economic stringency under United Nations Security Council sanctions, supplemented by stiffer ones from the United States and Europe. The international reaction has been generally positive other than that of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who, fearful of relaxed sanctions, said that Mr Rowhani cannot soothe nuclear fears, the control being with Supreme Leader.

The Group of Eight (G8) Summit, held on June 17-18 in Northern Island, provided an opportunity to reflect on Mr Rowhani’s victory. French President Francois Hollande said if Mr Rowhani was constructive, Iran could be invited for the Geneva meeting on Syria, stoutly resisted by most earlier.

British Prime Minister David

Cameron has supported talks with Iran, his immediate problem being downgraded IranUK relations since 2011 when crowds over-ran the British embassy in Tehran. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov had claimed separately that Iran was willing to abandon 20 per cent uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting of sanctions. US officials had earlier characterised Mr Rowhani’s election as a “potentially promising sign”, supplemented later by US secretary of state John Kerry even suggesting direct talks.

Regrettably, the Indian reaction came on June 18 when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sent his felicitations. I would have expected Dr Singh to call as soon as the victory was obvious on June 16 or 17, recognising this as an important moment for Iran and its people.

What does it portend for the region and IndiaIran relations? Mr Rowhani walked off the stage in 2005, on Mr Ahmadinejad assuming office, after serving as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for over a decade. His deputy, S.H. Mousavian, hounded by the Ahmadinejad government and now at Princeton, recounts in his book, The Iranian Nuclear

Crisis, that Mr Rowhani when appointed as chief nuclear negotiator on October 1, 2003, in a meeting with the Supreme Leader actually turned down the assignment accepting only when SL lamented that “this is a responsibility on my shoulders, relieve me of it.” Today, the situation is more complicated than it was in 2005. Iranian nuclear case is with the UNSC, sanctions are crippling Iranian economy and Iran is militarily committed to the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, bringing it into conflict with US-Israeli interests. On the positive side, Iran can be an asset in stabilising Afghanistan, curbing the spread of Wahabi-Al Qaeda extremism and de-escalating the Shia-Sunni confrontation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.

The conundrum is the old one, i.e. should it be an action-for-action or should Iran take some steps unilaterally towards making Iranian nuclear programme compliant with its international obligations? Mr Rowhani’s first press conference heralded change from Mr Ahmadinejad’s eight years of hectoring and bluster. He called IranUS relations “a wound that has not healed.” He talked of transparency in the nuclear programme and the need to enhance mutual trust and “constructive interaction with the world through moderation.” In Syria, he said he was opposed to civil war, terrorism and foreign intervention. The substance of all the arguments may be old, but the tone is different.

It was a decade ago, on June 16, 2003, that Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of International Atomic Energy Agency, submitted his first report on Iran to the board. Whether Mr Rowhani can reel back Iran from the abyss depends on what impact the election has on internal power equations in Iran where, after the 2009 election which also compro

mised the SL’s independence, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has gained ascendancy in the security and economic fields. Thus, Mr Rowhani’s ability to effectively engage his interlocutors abroad would depend on the internal power structure in Iran also rebalancing concomitantly. That SL allowed the people’s mandate to become public uncontested may be a sign that he realises that Iranian socio-economic stress may be at a point where it was dangerous to try rigging a verdict, as in 2009. If so, he may allow Mr Rowhani the leeway to start re-calibrating multiple friction points that Iran has with the US, Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, while getting the run-away tendencies of IRGC under control.

For India the change is welcome, as Indian anxiety has been mounting over the US-Pakistan endgame in Afghanistan. Keeping India-Iran relation on even keel in the last decade has been a challenge caught as India was between blossoming India-US relations and the relevance of Iran for Afghanistan, trade routes to Central Asia and as a reliable source for energy. Mr Karzai’s strong reaction to the manner of opening of the Taliban office in Doha only confirms Indian fears.

Hopefully, the Rowhani election would not be another opportunity lost. Former President Mohammad Khatami, elected in a similar wave in 1997, disappointed his young followers when he did not come to their rescue in his first term and student demonstrations were forcefully put down. In 2005, he explained that he wanted reform not counterrevolution. Iranian people have given reformists a second chance. Hopefully, for the region and Iran, Mr Rowhani will finesse it better than Mr Khatami.

Courtesy: http://www.ksgindia.com/study-material/today-s-editorial/8016-23-june-2013.html

Sunnylands & cold realities

Sunnylands & cold realities

Source: by P.R. Chari: The Tribune

What did President Obama and President Xi Jinping achieve in their much-hyped two-day meeting in the Sunnylands estate in California on June 7 and 8? No doubt, they got acquainted with each other, and took each other's measure. Apparently, the last such "blue sky" discussion took place between Chairman Mao and Richard Nixon in 1972. And the Chinese side had hoped that the two leaders would "have an extensive and in-depth exchange of views on bilateral relations as well as international and regional issues of common interest."

There were no surprises. Pre-summit speculation on the agenda proved accurate, and the issues discussed ranged from cyber-security to utilising cyberspace to human rights to climate change to North Korea. But these issues were not settled. US complaints of cyber theft by China were met with counter-allegations of electronic surveillance and data mining. China's support to imposing further sanctions on North Korea was appreciated, but it showed no enthusiasm to address the basic problem of deflecting Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons.

What was not discussed, however, was moderating the competition over fossil fuels and minerals, promoting China's entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, enabling the US to join the East Asia Summit, and seeking mutual understanding on regional disputes like Iran, Syria Afghanistan, and India-Pakistan relations. But the foundation was laid in Sunnylands to continue and extend the dialogue between the two countries.

But how far was China's larger purpose achieved to establish a "a new type of Great Power relationship"? Beijing assiduously promoted this objective to island the two countries and promote beliefs that they were the most powerful countries in the world, and Xi desired to treat President Obama as an equal partner. Did these objectives progress much further? Chinese scholars and officials were aware that the rise of new powers in the international system has always been attended by competition, rivalry, and tensions with the dominant world power.

In his book, "On China", Henry Kissinger informs that a hypothesis had been advanced in 1907 by Eyre Crowe, a British Foreign Service official, that predicted the course of Anglo-German interactions in the twentieth century. Crowe argued that the relations between an established United Kingdom and a rising Germany would clash, which did occur, resulting in the two highly destructive World Wars. At present, the United States, like the UK, is an established maritime power, whereas China, like Germany, is a rising continental power. Moreover, alliance relationships in the last century had shaped the international system. World War II was fought between the Allied and Axis powers, and the Cold War witnessed bitter rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Currently, the United States seeks to manage the tensions between its allies in the Asia Pacific region like South Korea and Japan on the "comfort women" issue. But China has embroiled itself comprehensively in multiple disputes with its East and Southeast Asian neighbours.

Despite this backdrop, the Asia-Pacific region has become the world's economic powerhouse.US trade with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries amounts to 56 per cent of its total trade, which increased from $1 trillion in 1994 to around $2.38 trillion in 2011. It was inevitable that a military dimension would be added to preserve this "Asian economic miracle". Significantly, five out of the seven major defence treaties signed by the United States are with APEC countries.

Apropos of this, the US "pivot" or "rebalancing" towards Asia envisages the transfer of some 60 per cent of its total naval assets into the Pacific Ocean; positioning of Marine forces to avail their expeditionary capabilities in Japan, Guam and the Pacific region; and, locating a Marine infantry company in Port Darwin, Australia, to train alongside the US partners in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. China's response has been to publish a map showing the South China Sea and all its islands under dispute as part of Chinese territory. Publishing it before the Sunnylands Summit perhaps sought to test Obama's will to global power. Clearly, the accrual to China's comprehensive national power has increased its confidence in dealing with the United States and evolves its own rules of international conduct. In other words, Xi Jinping's China seeks to make the rules, not merely follow the rules set by others.

Undoubtedly, the US financial crisis will inhibit its activism abroad. But it would need remarkable obtuseness to ignore that the US strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific plainly has China in its crosshairs. China's desire for "a new type of Great Power relationship" becomes explicable as a counter-point to the US policy of "pivoting" or "rebalancing" towards Asia. The US National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon, confirmed that the summit had felt that a "new model of relations between great powers" could be sought. What its outline will be is of great interest to the regional countries and, of course, India.

It is quite apparent, however, that much more trust will be needed to direct US-China relations into cooperative channels. How this trust will be generated remains to be seen. As Xi said, "We need to think creatively and act energetically so that working together we can build a new model of major country relationship." It remains a work in progress.


Not quite a coup

Not quite a coup

Source: by S. Nihal Singh: The Tribune

The armed forces of Egypt did not need much encouragement to engineer a coup to oust Islamist President Mohamed Morsi. Rather, the surprise was the alacrity with which masses on Cairo's Tahrir Square deliriously welcomed it. It was not so long ago that protesters, then including members of the now-maligned Muslim Brotherhood, were welcoming the downfall of Hosni Mubarak and his armed forces allies.

Behind this dramatic turn of events lies the one year of rule of the first Egyptian President ever to be elected. For the Brotherhood, it was a consummation of 85 years of toil, deprivation and persecution. But it had persevered, building up a grassroots organisation, providing food, medicines and money to the poor and the needy.

What happened during President Morsi's one year is a tragedy for Egypt and the role of an organisation that got carried away by its unpredicted good fortune to achieve power through a free election. And instead of governing the country and looking after all Egyptians, not merely the 52 per cent who had voted for him, Mr Morsi set about strengthening his own organisation, placing Muslim Brotherhood men in key positions, rushing through an Islamist constitution, giving himself extraordinary powers and packing the only assembly to function.

The suspicion, of course, was that he was not his own master, that the party leadership that had propped him up was calling the shots. Among his many blunders was the appointment of a person belonging to an extremist organisation as the Governor of Luxor, the famous historical site where the worthy's party had massacred dozens of tourists. The outcry against this appointment was so widespread that the Governor had to withdraw his own nomination.

The omens then were hardly propitious for this unique experiment in democracy in Egypt. Mr Morsi's orientation hardly suited him to his new role. The desperate need was to form an inclusive government to give the feeling to those who had fought for Mubarak's ouster a stake in the new dispensation. And it did not take those outside the Brotherhood circle long to feel alienated and left out. It seems that Morsi and his advisers and minders in the Brotherhood were stone deaf to the pleas of others.

It thus came about that as armies of disillusioned youth began planning and plotting the downfall of Mubarak on the first anniversary of his rule and gathered millions of signatures across the country to oust him , they went back to the iconic Tahrir Square. Not to be outdone, President Morsi's supporters set up their show of strength in another part of Cairo. What came as a surprise was the size of the crowd in Tahrir Square last Sunday which, by all accounts, surpassed even the crowds that had gathered on the same square to oust Mubarak.

That was the signal the armed forces were waiting for. In a transparent attempt to court the anti-Morsi protesters, the army flew its helicopters low over the square with the national flag trailing to provoke hoops of joy from the massive sea of humanity. Essentially, the die was cast. It remained for the armed forces to issue a 48-hour ultimatum and to tie up the loose ends. They invited civilian leaders for consultations, including the chief of Al Azhar and the head of the Coptic Church, recently the victim of hate crimes at the hands of Islamists. The new era has been inaugurated under a civilian dispensation but nobody is under any illusion who the boss is.

What of the future? Does Egypt go back to the drawing board again? Obviously, the armed forces will guard their turf. They have vast economic interests and privileges Mr Morsi refrained from axing although he did succeed in getting rid of the long-ruling army top brass. But it would be wise for the army not to be carried away by the euphoria of its soft coup and the welcome it has received from youthful protesters. The young may be volatile but they now feel empowered by successfully dethroning a dictator and an elected ruler who broke faith with them. Unless the army keeps faith with protestErs, it will come to grief.

However, there is the important question of the backlash from Morsi supporters, who naturally feel betrayal because they keep repeating that their leader was duly elected fairly and has now been unfairly deposed. One fear is that members of the Brotherhood might resort to violence, and they have considerable support in the countryside. There again, the sagacity of the civilians advising the army will come into play. Perhaps the approaching month of Ramazan fasting will serve to calm the waters. What is desperately needed is a major effort to reconcile a deeply divided society that has been further polarised by one year of Morsi's rule.

For the present the army enjoys the support of such men as ElBaradei, the former international atomic energy chief, and others such as the veteran former minister and Arab League chief Amr Moussa. The imperative need is to fulfil the promise of early elections to parliament under a new fair constitution leading to the election of a new President. There is much work to be done and the army's sincerity will be known by how the civilian faces of the new dispensation go about their business.

These events have placed the United States in a dilemma. It could not bless the overthrow of an elected President while seeking to preserve a privileged relationship with the Egyptian military, which receives an annual subvention of $1.3 billion. American interests in Egypt are underpinned by its service in relation to Israel as also because it is a pivotal Arab state. One problem for the Obama administration is the US law; once a coup takes place displacing an elected leader, military and other assistance has to stop. It is small wonder then that the US President is tiptoeing around a coup that is not quite a coup. The future promises to be exciting and troublesome.